Introduction
Hobbes, in spite of being in favour of absolute and legally unconstrained sovereignty, does not advocate despotic government; rather, he seems to endorse rule by law (Goldsmith 1996, p. 283) . Hobbes defines civil laws as commands of the sovereign, who thus sets binding standards for human conduct.
However, scholars differ as to whether or not all of the sovereign's commands qualify as laws. David Dyzenhaus (2001, p. 464) holds that the Hobbesian 'sovereign is by definition one who governs through law', therefore concluding that all absolute rulers are legally constrained insofar as they need to sustain the proper functioning of the legal order.
1 Thomas Poole (2012) agrees that there are certain restrictions, such as the law's publicity requirement, if sovereigns wish to rule by law. Yet, unlike Dyzenhaus, Poole (2012, p. 85) argues that Hobbes's 'sovereign has a choice between exercising power in two ways, the legal and the extra-legal'.
As for the question of why sovereigns would choose rule by law over despotic government, Poole (2012, p. 89) suggests that reason dictates that they do so. A functioning legal order does not only benefit society as a whole. It also appears to be in the sovereign's self-interest, as (an overuse of) extra-legal measures would risk the subjects' trust and might even provoke hostile reactions. 2 Despite this danger, Poole (2012, p. 89) maintains that, in Hobbes's view, overwhelming and unconstrained force is actually 'needed to institute law'. 3 These considerations help to bring out the distinctive features of rule by law within the broader context of Hobbes's political thought. However, Poole seems to attach too much importance to a few acrimonious remarks in Behemoth (Hobbes's late history of the English Civil War), therefore missing out on the intricacies of his argument on the treatment of rebellious citizens. This article additionally examines passages in
De Cive and Leviathan, specifically Hobbes's claim in these works that those who defy the sovereign could be treated as public enemies. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the Hobbesian sovereign has the power to decide whether individuals be admitted as legal subjects, or excluded as enemies of the state.
While Hobbes's specific understanding of legal citizenship may be inapplicable today, it will be suggested that he helpfully elucidates broader issues relating to the making and unmaking of citizens. Hobbes argues that subjection to the law can only be sustained if it is accompanied by civic education. Apparently for this reason, he also emphasises that governments need to assume responsibility if citizens engage in hostilities against their state. This, it will be argued, has important implications for evaluating attempts to deprive individuals of their citizenship. By way of example, the article considers the case of British citizens who joined Islamist militants in the Middle East and could be banned from returning to the United Kingdom.
Sovereign prerogative and the decisive use of force
In Hobbes's lifetime, the sovereign prerogative was at the heart of constitutional disputes about excessive royal power (Poole 2012, p. 69) . This is reflected in Hobbes's late work Behemoth (1990) , which presents an account of the events leading to the English Civil War. In this context, Hobbes (1990, p. 26) Hobbes (1990, p. v) , in his attempt to explain these events, emphasises the role of 'certain opinions in divinity and politics'. In particular, he suggests that Presbyterian teachings and classical notions of democracy inspired people to defy the sovereign authority (Hobbes 1990, pp. 2-3) . Yet, as Poole (2012, p. 71 ) aptly observes, the spread and implementation of such 'seditious' doctrines was only made possible by the monarch's lack of decisiveness in dealing with these challenges. When Parliament passed a bill of attainder to execute one of the monarch's close advisors as a traitor, King Charles decided not to intervene (Hobbes 1990, pp. 69-71) .
Hobbes further describes how, after this key event, parliamentary motions increasingly undermined the sovereign authority. Thus, it may not be surprising that
Hobbes also indicates his preference of drastic measures. He invokes the myth of Hercules' fight with Hydra (i.e. the beast which grew two more heads for every one cut off) to raise the question of whether the King could have acted more decisively (Hobbes 1990, p. 72) . In response, he proposes a rather crude reinterpretation: 'Hercules at first did not cut off those heads, but bought them off; and afterwards, when he saw it did him no good, then he cut them off, and got the victory' (Hobbes 1990, p. 72) . This seems to suggest that Charles, instead of negotiating with Parliament, should have suppressed their opposition through the decisive use of force.
Additionally, Hobbes (1990) offers some ideas as to how the King should have used his prerogative to prevent the spread of 'seditious' doctrines. After suggesting that Presbyterian teachings were one of the primary causes of the Civil War, which killed nearly 100,000 people, he advances this argument:
Had it not been much better that those seditious ministers, which were not perhaps 1000, had been killed before they had preached? It had been (I confess) a great massacre; but the killing of 100.000 is a greater. (Hobbes 1990, p. 95) .
As Poole (2012, p. 74) notes, this may imply that extra-legal killings of ministers could have prevented the breakdown of public order. Yet it needs to be said that Hobbes's sardonic proposal comes after an excursus on religious authority in ancient times. He mentions that Ethiopian priests even ordered their kings to commit suicide.
This only stopped when one monarch 'killed all the priests, abolished the custom, and rectified the kingdom according to his will' (Hobbes 1990, p. 94) .
In contrast to this story, Hobbes's account of the actual events prior to the Civil War indicates that sovereigns cannot simply apply unconstrained force against their own citizens. The King's attempt to prosecute Members of Parliament was met with considerable resistance, and, as Hobbes (1990, pp. 96-98) describes, only resulted in further parliamentary motions to limit the royal prerogative.
If there are any conclusions to be drawn from Behemoth, it is that such drastic measures carry a great risk for the sovereign, whose power ultimately depends on the citizens' obedience (Hobbes 1990, p. 27) . Thus, Hobbes notes that, although the King had a right to command all forces of the state, 'all the trained soldiers, and in a manner all his subjects, were by the preaching of Presbyterian ministers, and the seditious whisperings of false and ignorant politicians, made his enemies' (Hobbes 1990, pp. 27-28) . What is more, Hobbes points out that the English would never have taken well that the Parliament should make war upon the King, upon any provocation, unless it were in their own defence, in case the King should first make war upon them; and, therefore, it behoved them to provoke the King, that he might do something that might look like hostility. (Hobbes 1990, p. 28) .
In other words, the King's poor attempt to use of force against Members of Parliament only played into the hands of those who sought to deprive him of his power, and was perhaps even provoked by them in order to justify a rebellion.
This casts doubt on the suggestion that Hobbes advocates the use of unconstrained force against rebellious citizens. As will be shown in the next section, his position is actually more sophisticated than that. In De Cive and Leviathan, which are not closely examined by , 4 Hobbes addresses questions concerning the sovereign's right of war, the crime of treason, and the legal status of rebels in order to establish upon what grounds rulers may use force against them.
The legal status of rebels and their punishment
Given that Hobbes defines civil laws as commands of the sovereign, it follows that rule by law presupposes subjection. Presumably, this makes it difficult to apply the law in the event of rebellion (with the latter being understood as defiance of sovereign authority). As Hobbes (1997, p. 166) (Hobbes 1997, p. 166) . The sovereign retains, as Hobbes (1997, p. 77) further elaborates, his original right of war against dissenters. 6 In addition, Hobbes draws a comparison between rebels and those who defy God's authority:
[T]he atheist is punished directly by God or by kings appointed by God, not as a subject is punished by a king on the ground that he has not kept the laws, but as an enemy is punished by an enemy because he has refused to accept the laws. (Hobbes 1997, p. 164) .
In response to objections to this claim, Hobbes (1997, p. 164) explains in an annotation that he sought to establish a legal basis for punishing atheists. Supposedly in the absence of suitable civil law prohibitions, he invoked natural law.
In Leviathan, Hobbes (2012) advances similar views on the punishment of rebels.
His definition of punishment as harm inflicted by public authority with the intention to better dispose citizens to obedience (Hobbes 2012, p. 482) seems to imply that legal penalties presuppose subjection to the sovereign. Indeed, Hobbes (2012, p. 522) points out that people who are unaware of their obligation to obey their ruler would interpret any punishment 'as an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd'. Hobbes (2012, pp. 484-486) generally distinguishes between legal penalties and 'acts of hostility', including evils not inflicted by public authority and punishment without prior law, which do not meet the requirements of his definition of punishment.
Moreover, Hobbes points out that harm inflicted on declared enemies should not be called punishment, '[b] ecause seeing they were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it' (Hobbes 2012, p. 486) . 7 Yet, regardless of how those who defy the sovereign authority interpret their own treatment, they will, of course, be punished for their offences:
[I]n denying subjection [the rebel] denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Sovereign Power. (Hobbes 2012, p. 486) .
As a consequence of their defiance of the sovereign authority, rebels suffer at the sovereign's will. In other words, they do not receive the penalties that the law ordains for certain offences, but have to expect arbitrary punishment. This reading finds further support in Hobbes's (1840, p. 291) response to Bishop Bramhall, one of his main intellectual opponents: '[T]he traitor loseth the privilege of being punished by a prece-dent law; and therefore may be punished at the king's will'. Thus, Hobbes denies that the treatment of rebels must fulfil the criteria of legal penalties.
Hobbes's argument that the sovereign could use his right of war to inflict arbitrary punishment on traitors appears to be based on a particular conception of their status as enemies. In this regard, it is illuminating that, both in the original text of De
Cive and the Latin version of Leviathan, Hobbes consistently refers to rebels and traitors as hostes (public enemies) rather than inimici (private enemies). The analysis so far suggests that Hobbes invokes the sovereign's right of war and the legal status of rebels as public enemies in order to resolve a problem of law enforcement. Those who defy the sovereign authority can, in his view, not be punished on the basis of civil law (which presupposes subjection). However, the sovereign may banish them, or inflict arbitrary harm, which might serve as a functional equivalent to legal penalties. In particular, it seems that such punishment of rebels could deter other members of society from defying the sovereign authority.
Yet while Hobbes in effect proposes extra-legal penalties, he seeks to establish that rebellious citizens 'may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will' (Hobbes 2012, p. 486, emphasis added) . Hence, he apparently finds it important to establish that such a treatment of rebels is in accordance with the natural laws.
Hobbes also does not seem to envision a general suspension of civil law. Rather, it appears that the latter is merely no longer applied to particular individuals, who are excluded from ordinary jurisdiction after revealing their hostility. This does not nec-essarily affect the status of other citizens, who might still enjoy legal certainty as long as they do not commit the same offence (i.e., defy the sovereign).
What is more, rebels need to be convicted of treason before they may be treated as public enemies, which could be achieved through judicial procedure. Far from advocating secret killings, as Poole (2012, p. 80) This leaves Hobbes (2005, pp. 76-77) with the position that utterances are the best possible proof, which he defends against Coke's proposition that 'bare words' may be sufficient evidence for the crime of heresy, yet not for high treason.
12 Hobbes (2005, p. 75) points out that, strictly speaking, the law 'maketh not the words High Treason, but the Intention, whereof the words are but a Testimony'. Yet in effect, he argues that rulers could apply their right of war against citizens who reveal their hostility through utterances defying the sovereign authority. While this argument may lack subtlety, it shows that, in order to combat 'seditious' speeches,
Hobbes does not simply advocate extra-legal (or even secret) executions; rather, he attempts to provide a legal basis for punishing rebellious citizens.
The distinction between citizens and public enemies
Hobbes's argument concerning the punishment of rebels provides an insight into his conception of the legal status of citizens (or subjects), 13 who can, as has been shown, be lawfully excluded from society by the sovereign. This section will further examine Hobbes's distinction between enemies and subjects, arguing that legal citizenship generally depends on the sovereign's right of war and peace.
As is well known, Hobbes's social contract theory conceives of the state's constitution in terms of a transfer of right. The commonwealth comes into being when people renounce their natural right to all things, and thus 'conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills
[…] unto one Will' (Hobbes 2012, p. 260) . Based on this idea, Hobbes (2012, p. 262) concludes that 'sovereign' is the person (or assembly) who gains absolute authority, while every other member of society becomes a 'subject'. Thus, citizens of a Hobbesian commonwealth are defined in terms of their subjection to the sovereign.
In other passages, Hobbes contrasts the status of citizens vis-à-vis that of public enemies. As he claims in De Cive, 'everyone is an enemy [hostis] to everyone whom he neither obeys nor commands' (Hobbes 1997, p. 108) . Similarly, when arguing that atheists should be treated as God's enemies, he points out that 'men are enemies
[hostes] to each other when they are not subject one to another or to any common ruler' (Hobbes 1997, p. 164 This raises questions about whether it is truly up to individuals to decide whether to enter or to leave the commonwealth. 14 It certainly follows from Hobbes's social contract theory that the obligation to obey the sovereign arises from a transfer of right.
Obligation may also stem from tacit or attributed consent, including the mere fact of people living under the sovereign's protection (Hoekstra 2004, pp. 67-69) . However, while express or tacit consent have important implications as the basis for the citizens' obligation to obedience, consent alone appears to be insufficient to determine their status before the law. The latter, as has been suggested in the last section, also depends on the judgement of the sovereign, who possesses the right to determine whether or not someone should be excluded from the commonwealth.
While Hobbes defines civil laws as commands of the sovereign, he generally allows for the possibility that elements of the legal order derive from presumptions about the sovereign's will (Dyzenhaus 2001, p. 482 The legal basis for admitting or excluding citizens, thereby, appears to be the ruler's right of war and peace, which Hobbes (1997, pp. 79, 88; 2012, pp. 306, 342, 448) includes among the essential powers of sovereign authority. As a passage from De Cive shows, this right does not only concern making war and peace with other states, it also permits the making and unmaking of citizens:
[N]o citizen may privately determine who is an ally [amicus] Thus, the sovereign's absolute authority extends to the question of 'who are to be citizens', which presumably refers to the admitting (and excluding) of citizens. 15 This seems plausible insofar as the authority of Hobbesian sovereigns does not depend on the consent of particular individuals, but on that of a multitude.
Although the discussion of the sovereign's exclusive rights in Leviathan is less clear on this point, it lends itself to a similar conclusion:
[I]t belongeth of Right, to [the sovereign] to be Judge both of the means of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same; and to whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. (Hobbes 2012, p. 270 ).
Hobbes's reference to 'hindrances' and 'disturbances' may signify the sovereign's right to decide who is a public enemy. Moreover, he clearly expresses in the above passage that a ruler is allowed to do everything necessary for preventing war and restoring peace. This may be an allusion to the prerogative of pardon, which Hobbes, as mentioned above, defines as a granting of peace. Elsewhere in Leviathan, he points out that all offences against the state (including acts of treason) 'may without breach of Equity be pardoned' by the sovereign (Hobbes 2012, p. 534) . 16 As will be argued in the next section, Hobbes also seems to conceive of the prerogative of pardon as an instrument for restoring public order during an insurgence. While the sovereign gains absolute authority through the social contract, his right of war and peace appears to be retained from the natural condition. Hobbes (2012, p. 482) states in Leviathan that citizens have not literally transferred rights to the sovereign, 'but onley in laying down [their rights], strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all'. Hence, the sovereign alone retains his natural right, which permits everything required for self-preservation, including the 'subduing, hurting, or killing [of] any man' (Hobbes 2012, p. 482) . This seems to suggest that the right of war and peace is contained in the sovereign's natural right, which is prior to the constitution of the state. Indeed, Hobbes (1997, p. 69 ) sometimes identifies the natural right with the right of war.
In the
In view of the distinction between enemies and citizens, the fact that the right of war and peace is retained from the state of nature appears to be of crucial importance.
Given that civil law presupposes subjection to the legislator, the legal order of the Hobbesian state must depend on the sovereign's exclusive right of war and peace.
Without the latter, individuals could not be constituted as citizens (and thus distinguished from public enemies). If this reading is accepted, it follows that the sovereign prerogative is not simply, as Poole (2012) suggests, a precondition for the effective exercise of legal authority. It is a precondition of rule by law as such.
How sovereigns should use their prerogative
After examining Hobbes's views on the right of war and peace, along with the legal distinction between citizens and public enemies, it is now possible to reconsider the question of how sovereigns should use their prerogative. Hobbes, as will be demonstrated in this section, seems to be of the opinion that the right of war and peace can be employed to restore public order in the face of rebellion.
In general, Hobbes seems to commend a penal policy with a focus on deterring ambitious citizens from inciting a rebellion (Baumgold 1988, p. 113) . Thus, he points out in De Cive that punishments should, above all, seek to discourage the formation of factions and opposition to the current government (Hobbes 1997, p. 148) . In Leviathan, Hobbes (2012, p. 542) While those who incite others to take up arms against the sovereign should thus be severely punished, this is not the case for 'poor seduced people'. Hobbes clearly considers it more reasonable to show mercy towards the latter.
Hobbes was certainly aware of amnesties issued after a rebellion or civil war. 17 However, as Schrock (2006) suggests, pardon may also be considered as an instrument for breaking up an ongoing rebellion. (Sallust 2007, p. 24) .
In Leviathan, Hobbes (2012, p. 340) seems to consider the possibility of using the right of war and peace in a similar way. He first notes that group resistance against the state is generally unlawful. Despite this, it would be permissible to form a defensive league if a number of citizens had already unjustly resisted the sovereign, or all expected a death sentence (Hobbes 2012, p. 340 ). Yet the subsequent condition indicates that Hobbes, perhaps, only grants such an extensive right to show how it could be inhibited by sovereign prerogative: 'But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh the perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawful' (Hobbes 2012, p. 340) . Although he does not explicitly state that sovereigns should use pardon to thus subvert group resistance, it may be inferred that this is how the sovereign prerogative could be effectively exercised in order to break up an insurgence. As Hobbes notes in De Cive, uprisings generally depend on effective leadership (Hobbes 1997, pp. 138-139) . Hence, a sovereign may be well advised to single out those who lead and instigate the rebellion, while at the same time trying to win back the allegiance of other participants. Schrock (2007, p. 106) is unconvinced by such a strategy: 'Can the Hobbesian sovereign sink so low?--to peddling pardons?' Yet this objection misses the importance that Hobbes generally attributes to the prerogative of pardon, which he likens to a granting of peace. As has been shown, granting peace may be regarded as constitutive of the status of citizens, and by extension of the entire legal system (insofar as the latter presupposes subjection to the sovereign who 'commands' the law). If viewed in this light, it is understandable why Hobbes apparently advocates the discriminatory use of the sovereign's right of war and peace for the purpose of restoring public order. Not being achievable through the use of force alone, this ultimately re-quires that some individuals who engaged in hostilities against the state, and especially the 'poor seduced people', be readmitted as legal subjects.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the dissimilar treatment of insurgents implies an acknowledgement of responsibility. At first sight, Hobbes seems to exclusively blame rebel leaders. Yet he also states, in Leviathan, that '[t] o be severe to the People, is to punish their ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better instructed' (Hobbes 2012, p. 544) . Hence, it seems that, in granting peace to those incited to rebellion, the sovereign accepts responsibility for their apparent ignorance of the grounds of political obligation (i.e., the precepts of natural law that dictate obedience to an absolute ruler). Making sure that these principles are publicly taught is, as Hobbes (2012, p. 520) insists in the same chapter, one of the sovereign's most fundamental duties.
Hobbes's views on the exercise of sovereign authority in the face of rebellion may be construed as an answer to the question of how rulers could make war upon their own citizens without provoking further hostilities. However, while Hobbes's specific concern is with the treatment of rebellious citizens, his arguments seem to have more general implications. In particular, sovereigns have a responsibility to educate individuals in order make them better suited for subjection to the law.
Conclusion
Hobbes advocates absolute and legally unconstrained sovereign authority, yet he also holds that the state's power and survival is ultimately based on the citizens' consent.
If rulers did everything they are allowed to, they would likely undermine their own position and provoke the people's hostility. Therefore, one could conclude that it is in the sovereign's self-interest to avoid despotic rule, maintain the integrity of the legal order, and treat citizens differently from public enemies.
The distinction between citizens and enemies, thereby, appears to be fundamental for Hobbes's conception of rule by law. While the latter implies a self-limitation of government, it also presupposes subjection to the sovereign who acts as the sole legislator and supreme judge. Hobbes invokes the sovereign's exclusive right of war in order to provide a basis for the punishment of rebels. However, as has been demonstrated, he also seems to hold that sovereign authority generally extends to the question of whether individuals be admitted as legal subjects; those who defy the sovereign authority could, alternatively, be treated as public enemies. Hence, somewhat paradoxically, Hobbesian rule by law appears to be grounded in a notion of legal citizenship as being subject to a legally unconstrained sovereign.
On this basis, Hobbes commends the exemplary punishment of rebel leaders in order to deter disobedience. Yet what seems even more important is that those who were incited to participate in an insurgence be readmitted as citizens. Sovereigns could, as has been suggested, use their prerogative of pardon for the purpose of restoring public order. Granting peace to most of the rebels might not only be politically expedient; it also implies acceptance of responsibility for the uprising. According to Hobbes, rebellion partly results from the sovereign's failure to instruct the people in the grounds of their obligation to obey the law. Thus, in order to be sustainable, subjection to the law needs to be complemented by civic education. Hobbes's suggestion that civic education is required to prevent legal citizens from engaging in hostilities against their own state.
